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Economic principles suggest that formulas for tariff reduction should focus on 
reducing the highest tariffs by the largest amount. This raises efficiency by reducing 
the most serious economic distortions, and helps to maintain tariff revenues by 
increasing the volume of imports passing over relatively high tariff barriers. In the 
context of the Doha Round negotiations, there is an additional, and quite different, 
reason to prefer tops-down approaches. Many of the high tariffs that remain in 
industrial country markets are on products such as textiles and clothing that are of 
particular interest to developing countries. In part, this reflects the fact that developing 
countries were not active in the GATT’s main game of exchanging market access 
concessions during the Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds, when the GATT process brought 
about the largest reductions in industrial-country tariffs. 
 
Unfortunately, the use of tops-down approaches to liberalization makes negotiations 
difficult, since approaches that reduce high tariffs by more than low will likely have 
different effects on average tariffs in different countries. In the current negotiations, 
these differences have caused specific formulas advanced in both agricultural and 
non-agricultural negotiations to be rejected by countries that would have been 
required to make larger reductions. Clearly, then, it is important to understand what is 
to be gained from use of nonlinear, tops-down formulas. 
 
In this paper, Francois, Martin and Manole abstract from differences in the required 
reduction in average tariffs in order to focus on the implications of different degrees 
of concavity in the tariff-reduction formula. More strongly concave formulas reduce 
higher tariffs more sharply, and lower tariffs less strongly in order to maintain the 
same reduction in average tariffs. They use the framework of the flexible Swiss 
formula introduced by Francois and Martin (2003), to examine different degrees of 
nonlinearity within the same broad family of tariff reduction formulas.  
 
Francois, Martin and Manole focus on the major industrial-country markets of the 
USA and the EU. They first examine the efficiency benefits to the USA and the EU of 
using more sharply concave tariff-cutting formulas for their own tariffs. Given the 
low level of average tariffs, they find that these pure efficiency effects are very small. 
More sharply tops-down approaches are shown to provide larger welfare gains, 
although these changes are small in absolute value. When attention focuses on the 
change in market access experienced by developing countries, the importance of a 
tops-down approach is considerably reinforced. If average tariffs in the USA and in 
the EU are cut by an average of 50 percent using the sharply tops-down Swiss 
formula, the cut in the average tariff faced by developing countries is 56 percent in the 
USA and 55 percent in the EU. As more flexibility is introduced and the tops-down 
emphasis is diluted, the formula comes closer and closer to the proportional-cut case, 
the market-access gain to developing countries is reduced, falling to 50 percent with a 
pure proportional cut. While more work is clearly needed to generalize these results to 
specific countries, they suggest that developing countries may have a stronger interest 
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1.   INTRODUCTION 
 
There is a now a clear understanding that there are wide divergences between the 
broad approaches to tariff reduction initially proposed by different participants in the 
Doha Development Agenda. In his overview of the agricultural negotiations, 
Harbinson (WTO 2003a) emphasized the wide divergence between the Uruguay 
Round approach to tariff reduction favored by Switzerland, Europe and Japan, and the 
more strongly tops-down Swiss formula favored by Uruguay, other Cairns Group 
members and the United States.  He asked whether there were alternative approaches 
that might be used to form a basis for a compromise between the two approaches. In 
the negotiations on non-agricultural market access, the draft declaration for the ill-
fated Cancun Ministerial moved away from earlier proposals involving a Swiss 
formula for non-agricultural market access, instead calling for delegates to seek a 
“non-linear” tariff reduction formula to be determined (WTO 2003d). Difficulties in 
identifying formulas that satisfied ambitions for reducing high tariffs more than others 
and desires for broad equality of “sacrifice” resulted in the WTO’s July 2004 
Framework focusing on vague “tiered” formulas for agriculture, and non-linear 
formulas for non-agricultural products (WTO 2004).  
 
There seems to be broad agreement in the Doha Development Agenda negotiations on 
the desirability of a formula-based approach to tariff reductions, and many different 
formulas have been proposed. Some of these formulas--such as the Uruguay Round 
approach to agricultural tariff reduction-- allow discretion in assigning tariff cuts at 
the individual tariff-line level. Others are specified on a line-by-line basis, removing 
policy makers’ discretion at the individual product level.  
 
A major difficulty in comparing the different formulas under consideration is that they 
differ in many key respects, including the extent to which they reduce average tariffs 
and the extent to which they are tops-down in reducing high tariffs relative to lower  
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rates. Our objective in this paper is to provide a framework for evaluating the trade 
offs between approaches such as the Swiss formula that are sharply tops-down, and 
approaches such as the proportional cuts approach that are less targeted to reducing 
peak tariffs. 
 
The potential benefits from use of a formula approach are large. If a suitable tops-
down formula can be identified and implemented, we can be relatively sure that it will 
lead to a global welfare gain, since the social costs of tariffs generally rise more 
rapidly than the rates themselves
1 By contrast, approaches that focus on reducing 
relatively low, “nuisance” tariffs face the risk of reducing economic welfare and tariff 
revenues by diverting imports away from higher-tariff items (see Martin 1997).  
 
An important message from analysis of actual tariff data appears to be that the critical 
feature of a formula approach for welfare in the importing countries is not so much 
the flexibility of the formula (i.e. its willingness to go soft on peak tariffs) but rather 
the specification of a targeted reduction in the average rate.  In other words, as long as 
a reduction in the average is still met, introducing some added flexibility by moving 
closer to proportional tariff cuts may not greatly reduce the importing country’s gains 
from a tops-down approach. However, moving away from a strict tops-down 
approach in the industrial countries does seem to reduce the market access gains for 
low-income countries in industrial country markets.  
 
This paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2, we first provide some detail on the 
current market access landscape.  This highlights important issues related to tariff 
peaks, unbound tariffs, and gaps between bound and applied rates that will be 
important determinants of success for any formula approach.  In Section 3, we then 
consider some formula-based approaches. In Section 4, we set out the concept of 
“flexible formula” approaches.  In Section 5, we consider some practical 
implementation issues.  For illustration, and to assess the quantitative implications of 
alternative formulas, we examine an initial sample of 3 industrial countries and 3 
developing countries in Section 6.  In Section 7, we consider the tradeoffs between 
increasing flexibility and two dimensions of the cost of doing so—the reductions in 
efficiency in the importing country, and reductions in the cuts in average tariffs facing 
developing countries. 
 
2. A  QUICK TOUR OF THE MARKET ACCESS LANDSCAPE 
 
Tariff negotiations in the multilateral trading system have generally been based on 
tariff bindings, or schedules of concessions tabled under GATT rules, and the 
coverage and level of these bindings is an important element of the initial conditions 
for negotiation.  Table 1 provides information on the share of industrial-product tariffs 
(on a trade-weighted basis) that remains either unbound or bound above applied rates. 
While tariffs in the OECD (and Latin America) are generally bound, many Asian and 
African economy tariffs remain unbound despite more than a four-fold increase in the 
coverage of developing-country tariff bindings in the Uruguay Round (Abreu 1996). 
For almost all developing countries, existing bindings are, on average, well above 
applied rates, reflecting a combination of relatively high initial bindings, and the 
                                                 
1 See Vousden 1990, p233. López and Panagariya (1992) point out that the presence of non-produced 
intermediates weakens this general proposition.     
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subsequent sharp wave of reductions in applied rates.  (See Blackhurst et al 1996, 
Francois 2001, World Bank 2001). 
 
In addition to general Uruguay Round commitments, some important sectoral “zero-
for-zero” agreements are reflected in the next-to-last column of Table 1. OECD 
economies have between roughly 10% and 30% of tariff lines bound at zero percent.  
Laird (1998) estimates that zero-for-zero increased developed country duty-free 
imports to 43% of total imports.  
 
With the implementation of Uruguay Round commitments, average ad valorem tariffs 
on non-agricultural products in the industrial countries generally are around 3 percent.  
This is reflected in the first columns of Table 2. However, there are important 
exceptions such as textiles and clothing, where the average rate is roughly three times 
the overall average. This is reflected in the standard deviation and maximum tariff 
columns.  With full implementation of current commitments, we estimate a simple 
average industrial tariff in the United States of 3.2 percent, a standard deviation of 
4.3, and a maximum tariff of 37.5 percent.  The European Union has a higher average, 
but less dispersion.  We estimate an EU average of 3.7 percent, a standard deviation 
of 3.6 percent, and a maximum tariff of 17 percent. 
 
For the developing countries in Table 1, average industrial tariffs range from a low of 
3 to 4 percent to a high of more than 20 percent, estimates that are biased downwards 
by the omission of specific, compound and mixed tariffs from the data we utilized
2.  
Table 2 presents detailed data for three developing countries:  Brazil, India, and 
Thailand.  These countries span the spectrum of developing country bindings as 
reflected in Table 1.  Brazil’s tariffs are all bound, though the average rate for 
industrial products is 14.9 percentage points above the current applied rate.  We refer 
to this gap below as “binding overhang.”  India and Thailand’s tariffs are partially 
covered by bindings, again with significant binding overhang.   
 
As in the case of industrial tariffs, the stage for the agricultural negotiations was 
largely set by the Uruguay Round.  One key difference from industrial products is that 
essentially all agricultural tariffs are bound. However, in both industrial and 
developing countries, there is a large degree of binding overhang resulting from “dirty 
tariffication” or the use of “ceiling bindings” (Hathaway and Ingco 1996). 
3. SOME TARIFF REDUCTION FORMULAS 
 
A range of tariff-cutting formulas has been considered or implemented under GATT 
and regional trade arrangements. In this section, we focus on formulas implemented 
on a line-by-line basis, leaving discussion of discretionary approaches to Section 5. 
Stern (1976), Laird (1998), Laird and Yeats (1987) and Panagariya (2002), WTO 
(2003c) and World Bank (2003) survey a range of alternative line-by-line formulas. 
The first is a simple proportional cut, frequently described as a linear cut in policy 
discussions: 
 
                                                 
2 This omission has recently been remedied for applied rates in a few countries in the WTO’s 
Integrated Database and the UNCTAD TRAINS database available through the World Bank’s World 
Integrated Trade Solutions (WITS) program, and in data compiled by the International Trade Centre 
and CEPII.  
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t1 = c⋅ t0  (1)
 
Where t0  is the initial tariff (which may be an MFN applied rate; a preferential rate in 
a regional negotiation; or a tariff binding in the WTO context), t1 the rate after 
application of the formula and c is the constant proportion of their original rate to 
which tariffs are to be reduced.  
 
After years of negotiations aiming to accommodate differences in countries’ initial 
tariff rates (Preeg 1970), a 50 percent proportional cut formula was used in the 
Kennedy Round (1963-67). In the end, some products were exempted from this 
approach and permitted smaller tariff reductions on the grounds of their sensitivity. 
Since the products exempted had much higher than average tariffs, these exemptions 
substantially reduced the cut in the overall average tariff. Baldwin (1987, p43) 
estimates that, despite these exceptions, the reduction in average tariffs on industrial 
products was 35 percent. This compared extremely favorably with the average of 2.5 
percent achieved in the second through the fifth rounds of GATT tariff negotiations, 
generally conducted under the request-and-offer approach.  
 
An alternative proposal considered in the Tokyo Round negotiations, and suggested in 
a different form in the Doha negotiations by Konandreas (2003) was a general linear 
reduction approach: 
 
t1 = d + f ⋅ t0  (2)
 
where d is a positive constant and f is a number between zero and one. As with 
equation (1), this formula may be written with tariffs in percentage or proportional 
terms by making an appropriate adjustment to the parameter d.  
 
Formula (2) suffers, however, from a potentially serious problem with low tariff rates. 
If the parameter d exceeds zero—which it must to yield larger percentage reductions 
in higher rates—this formula will lead to increases in lower rates. While there may be 
a case for some such increases in tariffs as a way of reducing the variation in tariff 
rates and hence the cost of protection, such increases in tariffs do not sit easily with 
the trade liberalizing raison d’etre of the WTO.  To deal with this problem, the 
proponents of this approach during the Tokyo Round advocated that it be applied only 
for tariffs greater than 5 percent (Laird and Yeats 1987).  
 












where a is a positive tariff rate that becomes a ceiling on tariff rates. If tariffs are 
expressed in proportional terms, then the Tokyo Round value of this parameter was in 
the range from 0.14 to 0.16. For tariffs in percentage terms, the corresponding 
parameter values are 14 to 16. In the Doha negotiations, the United States and the 
Cairns Group proposed use of the Swiss formula with a coefficient of 0.25 for 
agriculture. 
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The Swiss formula has a number of desirable features for tariff negotiations. The 
concavity of (3) in the initial tariff rate means it has the desirable feature of reducing 
higher tariff rates by more, in both absolute and relative terms, than lower tariff rates. 
It is particularly effective in reducing peak tariffs, since even the very highest tariffs 
are reduced below the value a. From the importers’ point of view, tops-down 
approaches tend to reduce the economic efficiency losses associated with high and 
widely dispersed tariffs, and to preserve revenues, since import volumes tend to 
increase more on the higher-tariff goods. From the point of view of developing 
country exporters, tops-down approaches like the Swiss formula might also be 
expected to lead to greater market access gains to developing countries given the 
existence of industrial country tariff peaks in agriculture, textiles and clothing.  
 
To understand the Swiss formula it is useful to examine particular cases. For an 
extremely small initial tariff, say one tenth of one percent, the coefficient by which t0 
is multiplied in equation (3) ( a/(a+t0) ) is essentially one, so there is essentially no 
reduction in the tariff. For an initial tariff rate of a, the final tariff rates is a half of a, 
implying a 50 percent reduction from the initial tariff.  For a very high initial tariff, 
t0/(a+t0) is approaches one and the tariff rate is effectively reduced to a.  
A very stylized comparison of the proportional tariff cut of 0.5 used in the Kennedy 
Round with a Swiss Formula using the parameter 0.16 from the Tokyo Round is given 
in Figure 1. The diagram shows that the cuts in low tariffs are smaller using the Swiss 
formula than using the proportional cut formula, but that the cuts for tariffs above 
0.16 are larger with the Swiss formula. While the figure does not make this clear, no 
tariff would remain above 0.16 following application of this formula.  
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A number of other formula-type approaches to structuring market access expansion 
have been proposed. Josling and Rae (2004) consider alternatives including reduction 
of bound rates to applied rates; the introduction of ceilings on tariffs; and “cocktail” 
approaches with different formulas, such as reductions to a ceiling rate, proportional 
cuts and Swiss-formula cuts over different ranges of tariffs. Hoekman and Olarreaga 
(2002) examine the introduction of a limit on the ratio of the highest tariffs to the 
average as a means of dealing with tariff peaks. The proposal by China, and the 
subsequent proposal by the Chair of the Market Access Committee in the Doha 
negotiations (World Bank 2003) on non-agricultural market access introduced a Swiss 
formula with an a coefficient based on each country’s initial average tariff. 
 
4.  INTRODUCING SOME FLEXIBILITY TO LINE-BY-LINE FORMULA CUTS 
 
There are good reasons to question whether a pure Swiss formula, with a common 
upper limit of around 0.15 as used in the Tokyo Round, would provide sufficient 
flexibility for all WTO members to reach agreement on tariff reductions in agriculture 
or non-agriculture in the Doha negotiations. In fact, it seems very possible that the 
lack of flexibility of the Swiss formula contributed to the exclusion of large numbers 
of products with high tariffs from the formula in the Tokyo Round. Unfortunately, 
many of these products were items such as agricultural products, textiles and clothing 
that are of particular interest to developing countries, which were not active 
participants in the exchange of market access concessions at that point.  
 
Hoekman and Olarreaga (2002) note that peak applied tariffs in the industrial 
countries are now around 50 times as high as the average rate. This contrasts with a 
ratio of five in the developing countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, six in Latin America, 
seven in the Middle East and North Africa, nine in South Asia, and 28 in East Asia. 
Clearly, the widespread use in developing country trade reforms of tops-down 
liberalization approaches noted by López and Panagariya (1992) has had a profound 
impact on the distribution of developing country tariffs. The combination of quite 
large differences in the means and the variances of tariffs across countries seems 
likely to create a need for a formula that could encompass the entire distribution of 
tariff rates while minimizing pressure for exceptions and special cases.   
 
One possible approach to dealing with this problem involves application of a Swiss-
type tariff reduction, with a ceiling based on the individual country’s initial average 
tariff rather than a common Swiss formula parameter a.  In effect, this combines the 
targeting of the distribution of tariffs under the pure Swiss formula with the targeting 
of a reduction in the average tariff.  This targeted formula approach reduces the “one 
size fits all” problem of a common a parameter.  However, it still leaves potential 
political problems created by the very sharp tops-down nature of the pure Swiss 
formula.  
 
To address the flexibility problem, one might generalize the Swiss formula to allow 
more flexibility in dealing with different tariff profiles, as suggested in Francois and 
Martin (2003). Under this flexible formula approach, the idea is to allow greater 
flexibility of approach to accommodate different preferences over tariff maxima and 
rates of reduction.   
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One way to provide some additional flexibility is to modify the original Swiss 



























= − −  
(4)
 
We call parameter b a flexibility parameter as it allows the shape of the relationship 
between the initial and final tariffs to change
3.  As can be seen from the second term 
in equation (4), the original Swiss formula is a special case of equation (4), with b= 1.  
As will become evident, the impact of tariff reductions on peak tariffs can be softened 
by raising the a parameter. As b increases, the formula tends to increase the reduction 
in the lower tariffs, allowing for higher maximum rates with the same target reduction 
in the average tariff. The third expression in (4) shows that the flexible formula can be 
seen as a combination of a proportional cut and a Swiss formula. If b> 1, then one can 
see the approach as first imposing a proportional cut on t0 to obtain 
b
t0 ; then subject 
b
t0  to a Swiss formula. Clearly, there is an entire family of flexible Swiss formulas, 
distinguished by their b values
4. Comparing these formulas directly is difficult since 
changing b changes both the curvature of the line and the average depth of cut. like 
Microsoft EXCEL’s Solver can be used to find the combinations of a and b consistent 
with the targeted reduction in average tariffs and hence allow formulas with different 
curvature, but the same depth of cut in average tariffs, to be compared. 
 
To avoid formulas that increase the value of some tariffs, the flexibility parameter, b, 
should be one or above.  This extended Swiss formula retains the key feature of the 
original Swiss formula that all tariffs are reduced below a ceiling given by a. Figure 2 
illustrates, for an example with tariffs ranging from 0% to 90%, the percentage 
reduction in each tariff rate needed given a target of a 50% reduction in the average 
tariff.  As shown, there is some scope for trading off cuts in higher tariffs with cuts in 
lower tariffs through adjustments to the compensation parameter. This family of 
curves clearly provides much greater flexibility to negotiators who had, hitherto, to 
choose one or the other approach. 
 
                                                 
3 The first expression in (4) shows its similarity to the original Swiss formula. The second shows the 
source of the asymptotic feature of the formula—division by a rectangular hyperbola in the tariff rate.  
4 This might be called a Swiss-Army-knife approach to tariff reduction.  
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There is a limit to the flexibility we can obtain using the compensation parameter. As 
we raise b, we are substituting larger cuts in smaller tariffs for smaller cuts in higher 
tariffs. Beyond some point, it becomes infeasible to meet the required reduction in 
average tariffs. As shown in Francois and Martin (2003), adopting a combined 
targeted and flexible Swiss formula approach guarantees that peak rates will be cut by 
at least the cut in the average, even with flexibility.  
 
5. SOME PRACTICAL ISSUES  
 
Several practical issues arise in the implementation of formula cuts. These include the 
specification of the goal in terms of the depth of cut; the choice of the base rate to be 
cut; and the potential need for additional flexibility in the negotiations. 
 
5.1  Average cuts or cuts in the average?  
  
One fundamental parameter in negotiations is the objective of tariff reduction to be 
specified. Should it be specified in terms of a percentage reduction in average tariffs 
(simple or weighted); or in terms of an average tariff cut; or in terms of a ceiling tariff 
like the 0.15 used in the Swiss formula during the Tokyo Round; or as an average  
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reduction in the price of imports
5? One widely-advocated approach to tariff reduction, 
the Uruguay Round approach to agricultural trade liberalization, specifies its objective 
in terms of an average cut in tariffs, and leaves countries free to choose the reductions 
at a tariff-line level, perhaps subject to a minimum cut requirement.  
 
The difference between a cut in average tariffs and an average cut in tariffs seems 
minor, but is actually fundamental. Both in line-by-line approaches, and in those 
involving discretion at the tariff–line level, a cut in average tariffs is an appealing 
organizing objective in that it provides a measure of progress from the initial regime 
towards complete free trade. By contrast, an average-cut criterion is always close to 
meaningless since it does not take into account whether the cuts take place in high or 
low tariffs. Under discretionary approaches, an average-cut criterion encourages large 
percentage cuts in low tariff-rate commodities, as was evident in the Uruguay Round 
agreement on agriculture (Hathaway and Ingco 1996), and may lead to little or no 
reduction in average tariffs. By leaving peak rates relatively unscathed, it may also 
exacerbate tariff escalation. 
 
Proposals to use the Uruguay Round approach of a 36 percent average cut in tariffs, 
with a minimum cut of 15 percent in each tariff line seem likely to result in much less 
liberalization than the “headline” 36 percent cut.  Since members would be able to 
choose the tariff lines on which they make larger or smaller cuts, it would be feasible 
to make a reduction in the average tariff rate of little over 15 percent. Consider, for 
example, a case where a country has just two tariff rates, one percent and 100 percent, 
and policy makers want to minimize the change associated with this approach. The 
result is likely to be: 
 
Large differences between average cuts in the tariff and cuts in the average tariff 
  Good 1  Good 2   Average 
 %  %  % 
Initial tariff rate  1  100  50.5 
Tariff cut  57  15  36 
New tariff  0.43  85  42.7 
 
As is evident from the table, the 36 percent average tariff cut can be achieved with a 
reduction in average tariffs of only 15.5 percent, less than half the specified goal. And 
virtually all of this is the result of the totally inflexible minimum cut requirement. 
Since higher tariffs are typically those that are most politically sensitive, there is every 
reason to expect countries to behave like the hypothetical country in the table.  In this 
case, the result will be limited overall liberalization, and particularly small reductions 
in the peak tariffs that are of greatest concern to developing countries. With relatively 
large reductions in low tariffs and limited reductions in high tariffs, tariff escalation 
may even become worse. 
 
With all countries keenly aware of the option to minimize liberalization, and 
expecting other countries to take advantage of this opportunity, the pressure on policy 
makers to minimize the extent of their liberalization would be intense. It seems likely 
that the outcome would be reductions of 15 percent in almost all tariff lines with 
                                                 
5 This measure, defined for a small country by ∆t/(1+t), where ∆t is the change in the tariff rate, is an 
important determinant of the increase in market access resulting from a negotiation.   
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significantly trade-restricting tariffs. This approach has been described by the World 
Bank (2003) as “the cut you have when you are not having a cut”.  
 
If a discretionary approach is adopted, it would seem more logical to specify a target 
cut  in average tariffs rather than an average cut in tariffs. While preserving the 
discretion that advocates of discretionary approaches demand, a reduction-in-the-
average criterion does impose some realistic discipline. An average-cut criterion 
imposes essentially no discipline, and hence provides no basis for an exchange of 
market access “concessions”. 
 
5.2  Choice of base rate 
 
A key issue in implementing any formula-based approach is the base rate to which the 
formula should be applied. In a regional negotiation context, this rate will generally 
be the preferential applied rate. Countries using a formula approach to reform their 
own tariffs would generally use the applied MFN rate as the base.  Traditional GATT 
practice has been to focus on the bound rates contained in countries’ schedules of 
concessions. This has the important advantage of creating no disincentive for 
individual countries to undertake unilateral reductions in applied rates of the type that 
have so sharply reduced protection in developing countries during the past 20 years 
(World Bank 2001). In addition, this approach might be viewed as providing credit 
for unilateral liberalization in the sense that a prior unilateral reduction of applied 
rates reduces one-for-one the cut in applied rates required in subsequent negotiations.  
 
Clearly, the choice of bound rates as the base would mean that some countries would 
have to make only small, or no, reductions in applied rates. Since WTO negotiations 
depend on meeting the needs of all participants, the approach to be adopted must meet 
the needs of participants. At the end of the day, countries will consider whether the 
reductions in their partners’ applied rates, and the increases in the security of their 
market access, resulting from the chosen base and reduction formula (or other 
approach) are sufficient to make the resulting package worthwhile. Historical applied 
rates, such as the rates applying at the end of a previous negotiation, would give credit 
for autonomous liberalization since that time, but perhaps create some disincentive for 
future liberalization. 
 
5.3 Additional  flexibility 
 
Even with the additional flexibility allowed by the extension of the Swiss formula 
offered in this paper, there is a risk that it would not be sufficiently general to meet 
the political constraints of all countries on all products. One way to deal with the 
problem of exceptions while allowing additional flexibility would be to make a 
formula cut first, and to allow for renegotiations with compensation from this new 
base. This approach shifts the onus in making exceptions from the country to its 
trading partners, and seems much less likely to lead to fewer and smaller exceptions 
than the traditional discretionary approaches. Clearly, it would ensure the 
maintenance of a balance of concessions—the perceived lack of which created such 
difficulties in the Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds. 
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5.4  Non Ad-Valorem Tariffs 
 
Another potentially serious problem is created by specific, mixed and compound 
tariffs. Tops-down formulas such as the Swiss formula cannot be directly applied to 
these tariffs, since it is not possible to know which are the high and low tariffs without 
knowledge of the value of the goods. One option would be to convert all specific 
tariffs to ad valorem form prior to applying the formula, as is specified for non-
agricultural goods in the Cancun Ministerial Declaration (WTO 2003d).  
 
Whether the approaches outlined in this section and the previous section have any 
chance of being acceptable depends heavily on the nature of the distributions of 
applied tariffs and tariff bindings in member countries. The set of tables in the next 
section provides a very brief initial empirical assessment of the implications of 
formula approaches for a range of countries, taking into account the current 
distribution of their tariffs and tariff bindings. 
 
6. SOME EXAMPLES 
 
A simple, hypothetical analysis can illustrate some of the key implications of the 
approaches we discuss, including the implications of binding overhang. For 
concreteness, we specify: 
 
•  A target for reduction in simple average tariff bindings of 50% 
•  Unbound tariffs are initially bound at 150% of applied MFN rates 
•  The parameter b is initially set to 1 and is increased to 2.0   
•  Agricultural and nonagricultural tariffs were treated separately. 
 
Tables 2, 3 and 4 present the effect of formula-based reductions on the tariff 
schedules of the EU, Japan, the United States (industrial countries) and Brazil, India, 
and Thailand (developing countries).  Table 2 summarizes results for the basic Swiss 
formula, while Tables 3 and 4 illustrate the effect of adding flexibility while 
maintaining the same reduction in average bindings.  These results are summarized in 
Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. Binding Overhang in Industry 
 
 
For the USA, bound rates generally are very close to applied rates.  This is reflected in 
low initial binding overhang (the gap between average bound and applied rates shown 
as a percentage of the average applied rate).  This also means that all formulas 
considered lead to significant cuts.  The result is a reduction in maximum rates, 
variance, and average rates.  Notice from Table 3 that peak rates are not reduced as 
much when the flexibility parameter b is raised above 1.  In particular, while still 
achieving a 50% reduction in the average bound rate, the USA would be able to keep 
its highest ad valorem applied rates on industrial goods in the range from 7.3 to 9.9 
%, depending on the selection of the b parameter.  Similarly, the EU would be able to 
keep some peak industrial rates at up to 4.5 times the average tariff.   
 
In Brazil, by contrast, average bound rates are well above applied rates.  This is 
reflected in Table 2, as well as Table 4 and Figure 3. With a 50% reduction in average 
bindings, Brazil’s industrial average applied rate falls by 15.4% of its base value. 
While smaller than the proportional cut in average tariffs in the industrial countries, 
this translates into a larger percentage reduction in the cost of imports than those 
observed in the industrial countries. In agriculture, the binding overhang is so great 
that almost nothing happens to applied rates (a 50% reduction in bindings yields only 
a 3.7 percent reduction in applied rates.)  However, the binding overhang would be 
reduced sufficiently to ensure real liberalization in subsequent negotiations, and to 
constrain potential future increases in tariffs.  
 
India realizes a similar (i.e. very small) cut in applied agricultural tariffs, again 
reflecting high binding overhang in both developed and developing countries.  The 
reduction in the average industrial tariffs is greater than in the case of Brazil. This 
reduction of 8 percentage points in the average tariff on industrial products implies a 
much larger reduction in the price of imports than in the case of the industrial 
countries. 
 
Binding Overhang in INDUSTRY: 




















binding overhang as % of average
% reduction in average applied rate 
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Thailand, with less binding overhang, realizes greater reductions in agricultural 
tariffs, with these tariffs reduced by over 40 percent relative to their initial average 
level.  In the industrial sector, Thailand’s reduction in applied rates is just over 30 
percent, which necessitates a reduction in applied tariffs of around 3 percentage 
points. This generates a reduction in the price of imports that is larger than in the 
industrial country cases considered.  
 
In agriculture, the extent of binding overhang is much greater. Even with a large cut, 
such as the 50 percent cut in bindings considered here, we see only small reductions 
in applied rates on agricultural goods in Brazil and India. In Thailand, by contrast, we 
see sharp reductions in agricultural tariffs because of the limited binding overhang in 
this case.  
 
7. WELFARE IMPLICATIONS OF INTRODUCING FLEXIBILITY 
 
When considering an approach that would increase the political flexibility of 
negotiating modalities, it is important to have some idea of the potential economic 
costs of allowing such flexibility. One consideration is for efficiency in the importing 
country. For the single-country case, economic theory tells us that tops-down 
reductions in protection are likely to lead to greater welfare gains in the importing 
country than proportional cuts or, a fortiori, approaches that allow high tariffs to be 
reduced by less than low tariffs.   
 
A second consideration is the potential distribution of market access gains between 
countries. Given the preponderance of tariff peaks in the products exported by 
developing countries to the industrial world, tops-down approaches seem more likely 
to reduce the tariffs that are of greatest concern to developing countries, and hence to 
increase their market access gains. This potential difference can be measured by 
examining the impacts of different approaches on the average tariffs facing 
developing countries.  
 
7.1 Efficiency effects on the importer 
 
Economic theory provides two classic rules of thumb for piecemeal tariff reduction in 
a single, small country— (i) that a proportional reduction in all tariffs will increase 
welfare, and (ii) that a reduction in the highest tariff will increase welfare as long as 
this good is a net substitute for all other goods (Vousden 1990, Chapter 9). Vousden 
also shows that these welfare-improving conditions apply to multilateral, as distinct 
from unilateral, trade reforms as long as compensation is allowed. These rules, and 
the simple intuition given above, are strongly suggestive that a formula, such as the 
Swiss formula, that is strongly tops-down will be welfare-improving—and more 
strongly welfare improving than a proportional cut.  The actual difference between a 
Swiss-formula type cut and a proportional cut, though, is ultimately an empirical 
question.  Theory tells us the direction of the difference (“Swiss is better than 
proportional”), but not the magnitude.  
 
A simple approach to investigating whether use of greater flexibility, and hence a 
move away from strongly tops-down to a more proportional cut will have major 
welfare implications is to draw on the distorted trade expenditure function introduced 
by Lloyd and Schweinberger (1988), and further developed by Anderson and Neary  
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(1992). While we could take a computable general equilibrium (CGE) modeling 
approach, this would require considerable aggregation of the tariff data, which might 
cause us to lose information in the dispersion of tariffs within the twenty or so 
aggregates routinely used in CGE analysis. Instead, we have used a more 
disaggregated, but simpler, model with around 5000 tariff lines identified separately, 




We begin by representing the relevant features of the economic structure with the 
welfare evaluation approach of Lloyd and Schweinberger -- a distorted trade 
expenditure function: 
 
B  =  e(p, v)  - g(p, v) – zp(p,v,u).(p-p*)   (5) 
 
where B is the balance of trade, e is the expenditure function in a vector of domestic 
prices and total utility, u; g is revenue from production as a function of domestic 
prices and a vector, v, of resources (we might generalize this by using a profit 
function with variable intermediate inputs); zp is the derivative of (e-g) and equal to 
net imports of each good; and p* is a vector of world prices. 
 
If we assume a standard Armington-type structure in a small economy, with imports 
differentiated from domestic goods, but domestic goods perfectly substitutable with 
exports, then we can simplify the analysis of tariff changes by focusing only on e(p,u) 
and the tariff revenue function. When tariffs change, there will be no change in the 
realized value of g(p,v) and it can be ignored, unless there are distortions such as 
export taxes.  
 
To make the approach easy to apply, we write the expenditure and revenue functions 
using a Constant-Elasticity of Substitution functional form for the expenditure 
function and a tariff revenue function based on the import demand functions derived 
from the first derivatives of this function with respect to prices. In this situation, for a 
single economy, the relevant elements of the distorted trade expenditure can be 
written:  
 
B = [Σj βj(pj*(1+tj))
(1-σ)]
1/(1-σ).u    -     Σj pj*.βj.[pj(1+tj)/P]
-σ.u 
 
where P =  [Σj βj(pj*(1+tj))
(1-σ)]
1/(1-σ), σ is the elasticity of substitution, and the βj’s are 
the distribution parameters of the CES expenditure function. 
 
We calibrate this function using data on imports from the UNCTAD TRAINS 
database, and data on consumption of domestically-produced goods from the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators. In line with standard practice in the CGE 
literature, all domestic prices were initially set to unity to allow decomposition of 
value data into prices and quantities. This allowed the β coefficients to be determined 
from the value share data at domestic prices. A σ value of 4 was assigned, raising the 
elasticity of substitution above that in most empirical estimates of import demand 
                                                 
6 A better longer-term solution to this problem would be to utilize a two-stage aggregation approach 
like that proposed by Bach and Martin (2001).  
   15 
 
functions on the grounds that we are dealing with very finely disaggregated trade data 
for which relatively high elasticities of substitution might be expected.  
 
While the analysis in the earlier sections of this paper was undertaken for agriculture 
and for industrial products separately, in line with the negotiations at WTO, this 
approach would not be satisfactory for our welfare analysis. Second-best effects 
associated with reducing one set of tariffs, while leaving another set unchanged, might 
overwhelm the welfare effects of interest to us—those associated with different 
degrees of progressiveness in the reduction of high tariffs
7. Finally, the goal of this 
section is primarily illustration.  Therefore, we repeated the analysis using the 
extended Swiss formulas to reduce all tariffs in each sample country.  
 
The tariff schedules of USA, and the European Union have been analyzed for the case 
of a 50 percent reduction in simple average tariffs. These results are presented in 
Table 5 for the three different values of the b parameter identified in the earlier tables. 
The gains are, as might be expected, very small, given the very low levels of the ad 
valorem tariffs included in the database. As might also be expected, the gains from 
reform for the United States rise as the tariff reduction formulas are made more 
strongly tops-down. However, the differences between the gains with different 
degrees of flexibility are quite small. A similar pattern emerges for the European 
Union. In both cases, moving from the standard Swiss formula to a Swiss formula 
with a flexibility parameter of 1.5 causes only a very small reduction in the welfare 
gains from liberalization. 
  
What do these results suggest?  The results are of course very partial, reflecting only 
the efficiency gains from own-country liberalization. Further, they are based on tariff 
information that excludes the effects of specific, compound and mixed tariffs, and 
other charges such as antidumping duties. However, they are based on very widely 
dispersed real-world tariff data collected at a fine level of disaggregation, and 
probably do have some relevance for inferences about national and global efficiency 
gains from trade reform. We would draw the following conclusion. Whether and how 
we add flexibility is second order, and should not be a roadblock to achieving a 
reduction in the average.  This means that the selection of which formula to choose, at 
least among the tops-down options spanned by the flexible Swiss formula, is nowhere 
near as important as the more basic issue of simply selecting and imposing a targeted 
reduction in the average
8.  It may be better to simply focus on achieving large 
reductions in average tariffs, even if the price is acceptance of an approach, such as a 
pure proportional cut, that allows some tariffs to remain relatively high. This result 
may, of course, not be acceptable, in particular if such approaches are found not to 
achieve needed reductions some of the key tariff peaks restricting global market 
access, and particularly market access by developing countries.  
 
                                                 
7 The importance of this problem can readily be overstated. At least at the level of aggregation used in a 
CGE model, Hertel and Martin (2001) found that these second-best welfare impacts were very small in 
a prospective new round of WTO negotiations.  
8 Of course, if escalation-increasing approaches such as the Uruguay Round approach are considered, it 
may well be important to consider more than the resulting reduction in the average.  
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7.2 Market access gains to developing countries 
 
A key empirical issue is the extent to which changing the dispersion of overall 
protection, for a given average cut in tariffs, affects the average reduction in 
protection facing developing countries. In contrast with the efficiency issue addressed 
in 7.1, there is little that theory can say to guide whether tops-down cuts will be more 
successful in reducing the barriers facing developing countries. However, we do know 
that developing countries generally face higher MFN tariff barriers against their 
exports than do industrial countries (World Bank 2003, Chapter 2). Many have 
concluded that this difference reflects to a significant degree the limited presence 
before the Uruguay Round of developing countries in the “main game” of multilateral 
negotiations—the exchange of market access concessions. Whatever the cause of this 
discrepancy, it implies that approaches that attack tariff peaks more aggressively are 
more likely to be beneficial to developing countries, the greater the extent that 
developing countries face disproportionately high tariffs.  
 
To examine this issue, we increase the b parameter in equation (4) to reduce the 
concavity of the tariff cutting formula. At one extreme, we consider the classic Swiss 
formula set in such a way that it brings about a 50 percent reduction in tariffs with the 
greatest reductions, by far, in the highest tariffs. Then, we allow for increasing 
degrees of flexibility up to the point where all tariffs are reduced by a flat 50 percent. 
This is done by increasing the flexibility parameter in the extended Swiss formula 
from 1.0 to 2.0.  
 
The results of this analysis are presented in Figure 4 for EU tariffs faced by exports 
from low-income countries, and in Figure 5 for US tariffs faced by the same 
countries. In each case, the values of the flexibility formula are shown on the 
horizontal axis and the proportional reduction in tariffs on the vertical axis. We find 
that a classic Swiss formula used to target a 50 percent cut in the simple average tariff 
on imports into these two large economies does indeed lead to larger reductions in the 
weighted average tariffs facing low-income countries. In the case of the USA, the 
reduction in tariffs is 56 percent, while in the European Union, the reduction is 55 
percent.  Then, as the flexibility of the cuts is increased, the reductions in average 
tariffs faced by the low income countries fall progressively, to 50 percent when tariffs 
are cut proportionately.  
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Figure 4. Implications of alternative tariff-cutting rules for EU tariffs facing low-
income developing countries. 
 












1.0 1.2 1.5 2.0
Impacts of flexibility on cuts in EU tariffs on low income countries 
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Figure 5. Implications of  alternative tariff-cutting rules for US tariffs facing low-
income developing countries. 
 
Note: average tariffs on the vertical axis. 
 
Clearly, this simple, exploratory analysis confirms our initial hypothesis that tops-
down approaches produce larger reductions in tariffs facing low income countries for 
any given reduction in the importers’ average tariff. This gain is an important equity 
reason to favor strongly tops-down approaches to tariff cutting—such as the Swiss 
formula-- over more flexible, and perhaps more politically saleable, alternatives such 
as  a proportional cut. It seems likely that approaches that allowed peaks to be 
retained, such as an average-cuts rule would further reduce the market access gains 





In this paper, we first considered the advantages of formula approaches to trade 
negotiations, and noted the apparently widespread acceptance of these advantages in 
the current WTO negotiations under the Doha agenda. An important feature of these 
negotiations is the search for compromises between those seeking aggressive tops-
down market liberalization, and those seeking more limited liberalization, or seeking 
to avoid reform altogether. 
 
We then examined the key features of the market access landscape that will affect the 
choice of approaches to negotiations. These features include the large dispersion of 
average tariffs among the active participants in the negotiations, and the large gaps 
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Impacts of flexibility on US tariffs against low income countries
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In implementing a formula approach, one key practical issue is whether countries are 
to have discretion in the depth of cuts on individual tariff lines. Where countries have 
discretion, an average-cut criterion was shown to provide essentially no discipline. A 
seemingly similar, but in fact fundamentally different, criterion of a required 
reduction in the average tariff rate would potentially introduce some discipline by 
requiring cuts in at least some high tariffs. 
 
Our review of potential approaches to tariff reduction covers a range of line-by-line 
tariff formulas. The Swiss formula approach used in the Tokyo Round is seen as 
particularly desirable because of its ability to introduce a tariff rate ceiling, and to 
bring about larger reductions in the highest tariff rates. Unfortunately, it may be too 
restrictive to be fully applied in its original form, particularly because of the large 
dispersion in the average and dispersion of  countries’ tariff rates, and the presence of 
binding overhang in many countries.   
 
To overcome, or at least reduce, this restrictiveness, we examined the implications of 
targeted and flexible Swiss formula approaches. The first is a simple adaptation of the 
Swiss formula that is targeted to a specific reduction in average tariffs for particular 
country and commodity groups (eg agricultural and non-agricultural). The second is a 
more flexible version of the Swiss formula that would allow the same cut in the 
average tariff to be achieved with somewhat smaller reductions in peak tariffs.   
Essentially, this increase in flexibility would allow larger cuts in smaller tariff rates to 
be used to compensate for smaller reductions in higher tariffs. While such a change 
would almost certainly reduce economic efficiency, it may ultimately be preferable to 
a retreat into exceptions as a way of reaching a politically-acceptable agreement. This 
flexible formula approach potentially allows for a Swiss family of formulas, or a 
Swiss-army-knife type collection of instruments, with different tradeoffs between 
tariff cuts on higher and lower tariff rates.  
 
We examine the potential outcomes of applying this family of formulas in three 
industrial country markets—Europe, Japan and the USA—and three developing 
country markets—Brazil, India and Thailand. As an illustration, we target cuts in 
average bound tariff rates in each country, considering agricultural and industrial 
products separately. Preliminary analysis suggests that, in this situation, only a bold 
cut, such as the 50 percent target used in the Kennedy Round, would make substantial 
progress in increasing market access in both developing and developed countries.  
 
In the final section of the paper, we develop two simple methodologies for evaluating 
the consequences of different tariff formulas. The first approach evaluates the welfare 
consequences for the importer of different tariff reductions. When the welfare 
implications of different versions of the flexible Swiss formula are considered over 
the range from the Swiss formula to a proportional cut, we find that the gains are very 
similar for different degrees of flexibility.  This is illustrated with data for the USA 
and the European Union.  The basic qualitative message is the same in both cases.  
Increasing flexibility appears to have only a small impact on the efficiency gains 
accruing from a 50 percent tariff cut. From the point of view of economic efficiency 
in the importing country, this result suggests that the depth of cut in the average tariff 
may be more important than the extent to which this reduction is brought about by 
reducing tariff peaks. 
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The extent to which the formula used succeeds in bringing down high tariff rates 
relative to others seems to matter more for developing countries’ market access. 
Because many of the exports of developing countries face high tariffs in the industrial 
countries, we anticipated that tops-down approaches might be more effective in 
increasing the market access of developing countries. This expectation was borne 
out—formulas that reduced peak tariffs in the industrial countries more sharply gave 
developing countries greater increases in market access for any given reduction in 
average tariffs.   
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Table 1.  Industrial tariff rates and bindings -- post UR and ITA 
Percent of MFN imports that are subject to:  Tariff lines   




or bound above 
applied rates 
Share of bound 
duty free tariff 




Argentina  100.0 0.0  99.9 99.9  0.0 10530 
Australia 96.9  3.1  31.7  34.8  17.7  5520 
Brazil  100.0 0.0  91.0 91.0  0.5 10860 
Canada 99.8  0.2  45.7  45.9  34.5  6261 
Chile  100.0 0.0  99.7 99.7  0.0 5055 
Colombia  100.0 0.0  97.7 97.7  0.0 6145 
El  Salvador  97.1 2.9 96.0  98.9 0.0 4922 
European  Union  100.0 0.0  17.7 17.7 26.9 7635 
Hungary 93.6  6.4  3.3  9.7  10.4  5896 
India  69.3 30.7 14.8 45.5  0.0 4354 
Indonesia  92.3 7.7 86.6  94.3 0.0 7735 
Japan 95.9  4.1  0.1  4.2  47.4  7339 
Korea 89.8  10.2  3.4  13.6  11.6  8882 
Malaysia  79.3 20.7 31.0 51.7  1.6 10832 
Mexico  100.0 0.0  98.4 98.4  0.0 11255 
New  Zealand  100.0 0.0  46.5 46.5 39.5 5894 
Norway  100.0 0.0  36.5 36.5 46.6 5326 
Peru  100.0 0.0  98.5 98.5  0.0 4545 
Phillipines  67.4 32.6 15.5 48.1  0.0 5387 
Poland  92.8 7.2 44.6  51.8 2.2 4354 
Singapore  36.5 63.5 11.7 75.2 15.2 4963 
Sri  Lanka  9.2 90.8 1.4 92.2 0.1 5933 
Thailand  67.4  32.6 8.9 41.5 0.0 5244 
Tunisia  67.9 32.1 41.5 73.6  0.0 5087 
Turkey  49.3  50.7 0.0 50.7 1.4  15479 
United  States  100.0 0.0  14.0 14.0 39.4 7872 
Uruguay  100.0 0.0  96.3 96.3  0.0 10530 
Venezuela  100.0 0.0  90.3 90.3  0.0 5974 
Zimbabwe  13.6  86.4 3.9 90.3 3.0 1929 
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Table 2 
Summary of the Effects of Basic Swiss Formula Reductions 
Applied tariffs before and after a 50% cut in average tariff bindings 
 Agriculture          






















5.9 7.5  74.9  0.3 3.0  2.9 10.9 0.1 -48.6 
Japan 6.2  8.1  43.3  1.2  3.5  3.7 13.9 0.2 -43.0 
United 
States 
3.5 7.4  90.0  0.5 1.9  2.4 11.5 0.1 -46.6 
                            
Brazil  12.9 5.1 27.0  22.6  12.4 4.6 22.3 5.3 -3.7 
India  31.0 20.8  150.0  90.7 29.5 14.9 70.8 31.3 -4.8 
Thailand 26.5 14.4 65.0 7.1 15.1 6.3 30.1 1.7 -43.0 
 Non-agriculture       






















3.7 3.6  17.0  0.4 1.9 1.4 5.0 0.1  -47.7 
Japan 2.3  3.4  30.9  0.1  1.2 1.4 5.6 0.0  -48.5 
United 
States 
3.2 4.3  37.5  0.2 1.7 1.6 6.1 0.0  -48.3 
                            
Brazil 15.9  6.0  35.0  14.9  13.5 4.2 16.7 1.9 -15.4 
India 19.2  16.5  40.0  3.9  11.3 9.2 30.5 0.3 -41.3 
Thailand 10.5 10.8 80.0 7.8  7.2  6.1 20.7 2.0 -31.6 
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Table 3 
EU, Japan, and US: Effects of a 50% Reduction in Average Bound Rates 
EUROPEAN UNION       













*Ag 1  0  5.9  7.5  74.9  0.3  N/A 
*Non-Ag 1  0  3.7  3.6  17.0  0.4  N/A 
                      
Ag  12.7 1.0  3.0  2.9 10.9 0.1 -48.6 
Non-Ag  6.4 1.0 1.9 1.4 5.0 0.1  -47.7 
                      
Ag  16.5 1.2  3.0  3.0 13.0 0.1 -48.5 
Non-Ag  8.2 1.2 1.9 1.5 5.7 0.1  -47.6 
                      
Ag  27.9 1.5  3.0  3.2 17.9 0.1 -48.4 
Non-Ag  13.7  1.5 1.9 1.6 7.1 0.1  -47.5 
        
Percent of industrial tariff lines currently unbound:  0%  
  
*Note:  a=1, b=0 corresponds to zero cuts.  The first two rows therefore represent post- 
Uruguay Round (or base) rates of tariffs. 
Also, agricultural tariffs are limited to ad valorem tariffs.  Other specific tariffs may be 
applied to excluded tariff lines, typically at higher ad valorem rates than averages shown. 
 
JAPAN       













*Ag 1  0  6.2  8.1  43.3  1.2  N/A 
*Non-Ag 1  0  2.3  3.4  30.9  0.1  N/A 
                       
Ag  17.1 1.0  3.5  3.7 13.9 0.2 -43.0 
Non-Ag  6.3 1.0 1.2 1.4 5.6 0.0  -48.5 
                       
Ag  22.7 1.2  3.5  3.9 16.6 0.2 -43.2 
Non-Ag  8.1 1.2 1.2 1.5 6.8 0.0  -48.4 
                       
Ag  39.6 1.5  3.5  4.2 21.3 0.2 -43.7 
Non-Ag  13.9  1.5 1.2 1.6 9.7 0.0  -48.4 
  
Percent of industrial tariff lines currently unbound:  0.84%  
  
*Note:  a=1, b=0 corresponds to zero cuts.  The first two rows therefore represent post- 
Uruguay Round (or base) rates of tariffs. 
Also, agricultural tariffs are limited to ad valorem tariffs.  Other specific tariffs may be 
applied to excluded tariff lines, typically at higher ad valorem rates than averages shown.  
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Table 3 – continued 
UNITED STATES      













*Ag 1  0  3.5  7.4  90.0  0.5  N/A 
*Non-Ag 1  0  3.2  4.3  37.5  0.2  N/A 
                       
Ag  12.4 1.0  1.9  2.4 11.5 0.1 -46.6 
Non-Ag  7.2 1.0 1.7 1.6 6.1 0.0  -48.3 
                       
Ag  17.4 1.2  1.9  2.6 15.3 0.1 -46.2 
Non-Ag  9.5 1.2 1.7 1.7 7.3 0.0  -48.2 
                       
Ag  34.7 1.5  1.9  3.0 26.0 0.1 -45.9 
Non-Ag  16.2  1.5 1.7 1.9 9.9 0.0  -48.1 
             
Percent of industrial tariff lines currently unbound:  0%  
  
*Note:  a=1, b=0 corresponds to zero cuts.  The first two rows therefore represent post- 
Uruguay Round (or base) rates of tariffs. 
Also, agricultural tariffs are limited to ad valorem tariffs.  Other specific tariffs may be 
applied to excluded tariff lines, typically at higher ad valorem rates than averages shown. 
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Table 4 
Brazil, India, Thailand: Effects of a 50% Reduction in Average Bound Rates 
BRAZIL       













*Ag 1  0  12.9  5.1  27.0  22.6  N/A 
*Non-Ag 1  0  15.9  6.0  35.0 14.9 N/A 
                       
Ag 37.4  1  12.4  4.6  22.3  5.3  -3.7 
Non-Ag 31.8  1  13.5  4.2  16.7  1.9  -15.4 
                       
Ag  47.0 1.2 12.4 4.6 23.2 5.3 -4.0 
Non-Ag  39.8 1.2 13.5 4.3 16.8 1.9 -15.3 
                       
Ag  75.8 1.5 12.3 4.6 24.7 5.4 -4.5 
Non-Ag  64.3 1.5 13.5 4.4 17.1 1.9 -15.1 
  
Percent of industrial tariff lines currently unbound:  0%  
  
*Note:  a=1, b=0 corresponds to zero cuts.  The first two rows therefore represent post- 
Uruguay Round (or base) rates of tariffs. 
Also, agricultural tariffs are limited to ad valorem tariffs.  Other specific tariffs may be 
applied to excluded tariff lines, typically at higher ad valorem rates than averages shown. 
 
INDIA       













*Ag  1  0  31.0  20.8 150.0 90.7  N/A 
*Non-Ag  1  0  19.2  16.5  40.0 3.9 N/A 
                      
Ag  134.2  1  29.5 14.9 70.8 31.3 -4.8 
Non-Ag  38.3  1  11.3 9.2 30.5 0.3 -41.3 
                      
Ag  169.9 1.2  29.5 15.0 72.0 31.4 -4.9 
Non-Ag  48.1 1.2 11.3 9.3 34.7 0.3 -41.3 
                      
Ag  277.2 1.5  29.4 15.1 73.5 31.4 -5.0 
Non-Ag  77.6 1.5 11.2 9.3 35.0 0.3 -41.3 
 
Percent of industrial tariff lines currently unbound:  38%  
 
*Note:  a=1, b=0 corresponds to zero cuts.  The first two rows therefore represent post- 
Uruguay Round (or base) rates of tariffs. 
Also, agricultural tariffs are limited to ad valorem tariffs.  Other specific tariffs may be 
applied to excluded tariff lines, typically at higher ad valorem rates than averages shown. 
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Table 4 -- continued 
 
THAILAND      













*Ag 1  0  26.5  14.4  65.0  7.1  N/A 
*Non-Ag 1  0  10.5 10.8 80.0  7.8  N/A 
             
Ag  38.2 1.0 15.1 6.3 30.1 1.7 -43.0 
Non-Ag  27.8 1.0  7.2  6.1 20.7 2.0 -31.6 
             
Ag  48.9 1.2 15.1 6.6 34.6 1.7 -42.9 
Non-Ag  35.0 1.2  7.2  6.1 23.0 2.0 -31.4 
             
Ag  81.5 1.5 15.1 7.2 43.8 1.7 -42.9 
Non-Ag  56.5 1.5  7.2  6.2 27.4 1.9 -31.1 
    
Percent of industrial tariff lines currently unbound:  32% 
    
*Note:  a=1, b=0 corresponds to zero cuts.  The first two rows therefore represent post-
Uruguay Round (or base) rates of tariffs.   
Also, agricultural tariffs are limited to ad valorem tariffs.  Other specific tariffs may be 
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Table 5 
Welfare implications of a 50% reduction in bound tariffs under 
different degrees of flexibility 
 USA    EU 
  % of GDP  % of GDP 
b=1 0.0548  0.0463 
b=1.2 0.0535  0.0455 
b=1.5 0.0508  0.0440 
 




November 13, 2004 5:44 PM 